Tor es muy popular por ser anónimo en Internet. Esta herramienta permite
al usuario proteger la privacidad de sus actividades. Tor proviene de
The Onion Router, y protege al usuario pues no gaurda ningún archivo de
registro. La mayoría de las agencias gubernamentales o la ley de
aplicación de la ley mantienen una vigilancia en Internet como el
buscador de Google más popular. Pero en Tor todo es anónimo. Este
proyecto se desarrolló en 2002 y consta de enormes proxies, utiliza los
relés y los nodos para permanecer en el anonimato a través de Internet.
Tor crea un túnel donde rebota a un usuario desde diferentes relés.
Alojar un servicio Tor es muy
fácil y también puede alojar su propio sitio web en TOR.
De acuerdo con investigadores en seguridad en redes del Instituto
Internacional de Seguridad Cibernética, crear un enlace personalizado no es tan
difícil. Este método es utilizado principalmente por los spammers que intentan
vender contenido irrelevante en la deep web. La siguiente demostración será
realizada en Kali Linux.
Alojar un servidor web en Tor
Antes de alojar el servicio en Tor, se recomienda probar el
servicio de alojamiento predeterminado de Tor. Para probar el servicio
predeterminado estamos usando el servidor Apache. Puede utilizar
cualquier servidor web
Para iniciar el servidor teclee sudo service apache2 start
root@kali:/home/iicybersecurity# sudo service apache2 restart
Luego, para verificar si el servidor ha iniciado, escriba ps -ef | grep apache2
root@kali:~# cd /etc/tor
root@kali:/etc/tor#
root@kali:/etc/tor# ls
torrc torrc.save torsocks.conf
root@kali:/etc/tor# nano torrc
Configuration file for a typical Tor user
Last updated 9 October 2013 for Tor 0.2.5.2-alpha.
(may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
#
Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
by removing the "#" symbol.
#
See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
for more options you can use in this file.
#
Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#torrc
Tor opens a socks proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
configure one below. Set "SocksPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
SocksPort 9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
SocksPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
First entry that matches wins. If no SocksPolicy is set, we accept
all (and only) requests that reach a SocksPort. Untrusted users who
can access your SocksPort may be able to learn about the connections
you make.
SocksPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
SocksPolicy reject *
Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
you want.
#
We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
#
Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to /var/log/tor/notices.log
Log notice file /var/log/tor/notices.log
Send every possible message to /var/log/tor/debug.log
Log debug file /var/log/tor/debug.log
Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
Log notice syslog
To send all messages to stderr:
Log debug stderr
Uncomment this to start the process in the background… or use
--runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
RunAsDaemon 1
The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
ControlPort 9051
If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
HashedControlPassword 16:872860B76453A77D60CA2BB8C1A7042072093276A3D701AD684053EC4C
CookieAuthentication 1
######### This section is just for location-hidden services
Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
contents of the file "…/hidden_service/hostname" for the address
to tell people.
#
HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
address y:z.
HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/other_hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
#HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
########## This section is just for relays
#
See https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-doc-relay for details.
Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
ORPort 9001
If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
yourself to make this work.
ORPort 443 NoListen
ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
Address noname.example.com
If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
outgoing traffic to use.
OutboundBindAddress 10.0.0.5
A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
Nickname ididnteditheconfig
Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
be at least 20 KB.
Note that units for these config options are bytes per second, not bits
per second, and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10, 2^20, etc.
RelayBandwidthRate 100 KB # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KB # But allow bursts up to 200KB/s (1600Kbps)
Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
not to their sum: setting "4 GB" may allow up to 8 GB total before
hibernating.
#
Set a maximum of 4 gigabytes each way per period.
AccountingMax 4 GB
Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
AccountingStart day 00:00
Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
is per month)
AccountingStart month 3 15:00
Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
ContactInfo Random Person
You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person
Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
if you have enough bandwidth.
DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
forwarding yourself to make this work.
DirPort 80 NoListen
DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
distribution for a sample.
DirPortFrontPage /etc/tor/tor-exit-notice.html
Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#MultipleRelays
However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
break its concealability and potentionally reveal its IP/TCP address.
MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,…
A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
to last, and the first match wins. If you want to replace
the default exit policy, end this with either a reject : or an
accept :. Otherwise, you're augmenting (prepending to) the
default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
described in the man page or at
https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html
#
Look at https://www.torproject.org/faq-abuse.html#TypicalAbuses
for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
#
If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
users will be told that those destinations are down.
#
For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
networks, including to your public IP address. See the man page entry
for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow "exit enclaving".
#
ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports but no more
ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp as well as default exit policy
ExitPolicy reject : # no exits allowed
Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
BridgeRelay 1
By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
PublishServerDescriptor 0
Después de completar todo el proceso, abra un nuevo terminal y escriba tor
root@kali:/home/iicybersecurity# tor
Dec 26 00:02:50.045 [notice] Tor 0.3.4.9 (git-cf9f4bf3cf8b43bb) running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.1a, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma 5.2.2, and Libzstd 1.3.4.
Dec 26 00:02:50.047 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
Dec 26 00:02:50.047 [warn] Tor was compiled with zstd 1.3.5, but is running with zstd 1.3.4. For safety, we'll avoid using advanced zstd functionality.
Dec 26 00:02:50.092 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
Dec 26 00:02:50.197 [notice] Scheduler type KIST has been enabled.
Dec 26 00:02:50.197 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
Dec 26 00:02:50.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.
Dec 26 00:02:51.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6.
Dec 26 00:02:51.000 [warn] You are running Tor as root. You don't need to, and you probably shouldn't.
Dec 26 00:02:51.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
Dec 26 00:02:53.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "default"
Dec 26 00:02:53.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network
Dec 26 00:02:53.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop
Dec 26 00:02:54.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit
Dec 26 00:02:55.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client functionality is working.
Dec 26 00:02:55.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done
Para comprobar si tor está en ejecución o no, escriba ps -ef | grep tor
Luego vaya a otra ubicación de tor para abrir el enlace onion. Para esto, teclee cd /var/lib/tor/hidden_service
Luego escriba ls
Escriba cat hostname
root@kali:/etc/tor# cd /var/lib/tor/hidden_service
root@kali:/var/lib/tor/hidden_service# ls
hostname private_key
root@kali:/var/lib/tor/hidden_service# cat hostname
bzak2gopn2llmsnv.onion
Copie la URL de onion y abra esa URL en el navegador como se muestra a continuación:
Como puede ver arriba, la URL onion está funcionando
con el servidor apache
Crear una URL onion personalizada
También puede crear una URL onion personalizada con una herramienta llamada Eschalot
Eschalot
es la herramienta utilizada para generar los nombres onion
personalizados. Utiliza el método de fuerza bruta para generar nombres
personalizados.
Eschalot se puede utilizar en cualquier distribución de Linux. Para mostrar estamos usando Kali Linux para generar los nombres
También puede ingresar el nombre deseado en caracteres, pero no todos
root@kali:/home/iicybersecurity/Downloads# git clone https://github.com/ReclaimYourPrivacy/eschalot.git
Cloning into 'eschalot'…
remote: Enumerating objects: 76, done.
remote: Total 76 (delta 0), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 76
Unpacking objects: 100% (76/76), done.
root@kali:/home/iicybersecurity/Downloads# ls
eschalot
root@kali:/home/iicybersecurity/Downloads# cd eschalot/
root@kali:/home/iicybersecurity/Downloads/eschalot# ls
CHANGELOG eschalot.c LICENSE Makefile nouns.txt README top1000.txt top150adjectives.txt top400nouns.txt typecard.c worgen.c
root@kali:/home/iicybersecurity/Downloads/eschalot# make
cc -std=c99 -O2 -fPIC -finline-functions -Wall -W -Wunused -pedantic -Wpointer-arith -Wreturn-type -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wcast-qual -Wextra -o eschalot eschalot.c -lpthread -lssl -lcrypto
In function ‘setoptions’,
inlined from ‘main’ at eschalot.c:172:2:
eschalot.c:788:4: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound 17 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation]
strncpy(prefix, optarg, ONION_LENP1);
^~~~~~~~
cc -std=c99 -O2 -fPIC -finline-functions -Wall -W -Wunused -pedantic -Wpointer-arith -Wreturn-type -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-prototypes -Wshadow -Wcast-qual -Wextra -o worgen worgen.c
Después de instalar teclee eschalot ./eschalot -vct4 -p null
./escalot es la herramienta que se utilizará para crear el enlace personalizado de onion
-vct se utiliza para la lista de palabras por defecto de Eschalot
4 es el número de núcleos de CPU
null
funcionará como prefijo. Puede ingresar cualquiera de los alfabetos que
se utilizan para generar el enlace de cebolla. Puede escribir aaa o adc cualquier alfabeto
El
comando anterior generará el enlace onion con las claves RSA. El enlace
se generará continuamente. Para detener la generación de los enlaces de
cebolla ingrese ctrl + c
Las claves RSA se utilizan para la
autenticación durante la sesión SSL. Esta clave forma parte de una clave
pública que generalmente se utiliza en los certificados SSL
Como se puede ver el servicio tor no se está ejecutando. Ahora
tiene que copiar las claves RSA de cebolla generadas de eschalot en el
servicio oculto tor
Para esto, teclee cd /var/lib/tor/hidden_service
Entonces escribe ls
Escriba rm hostname
root@kali:/home/iicybersecurity/Downloads/eschalot# cd /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
root@kali:/var/lib/tor/hidden_service# ls
hostname private_key
root@kali:/var/lib/tor/hidden_service# rm hostname
root@kali:/var/lib/tor/hidden_service# ls
private_key
Ahora tienes que editar el private_key. Abra la
clave privada e ingrese la clave RSA que se genera eschalot en private_key.
Copie la clave RSA completa desde donde descargó
el Eschalot. Copiar la clave completa
De BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY a END RSA
PRIVATE KEY como se muestra a continuación
Escriba nano private_key para copiar la clave
Luego abra otra terminal
Y escribe TOR para iniciar Tor en el Kali Linux
root@kali:/var/lib/tor/hidden_service# nano private_key
GNU nano 2.9.8 private_key
Después de actualizar la clave privada, vaya al directorio tor/hidden_services
root@kali:/home/iicybersecurity/Downloads/eschalot# ls
CHANGELOG eschalot.c Makefile README top150adjectives.txt typecard.c worgen.c
eschalot LICENSE nouns.txt top1000.txt top400nouns.txt worgen
root@kali:/home/iicybersecurity/Downloads/eschalot# cd /var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
root@kali:/var/lib/tor/hidden_service# ls
hostname nullbhldupqqrafc.onion private_key
Como se puede ver, tor ha agregado el enlace de cebolla a su
servicio. Ahora abra el navegador Tor e ingrese el enlace de cebolla
como se muestra a continuación
El servicio Tor ha añadido el enlace de cebolla.
También puede ingresar a crear su propio enlace de cebolla y alojar en la red
TOR
TENGA CUIDADO MIENTRAS SE ALOJA EN TOR. SI TIENE MATERIAL ILEGAL PUEDE
ENFRENTAR PERSECUCIÓN DE LAS AGENCAS DE CUMPLIMIENTO DE LA LEY
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